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Abstract
Using a novel dataset from agricultural censuses and geological sources, I examine the selection into mixed marriages between whites and Cherokee Indians in North Carolina during the
late nineteenth century. I find that the well-documented wealth advantage of Cherokee Indian
households containing white husbands is driven mostly by positive selection. Thus, once family
fixed effects are controlled for, the observed intermarriage premium is completely eliminated.
(JEL D03, N31, O12.)
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Introduction

Across time and space, marrying across racial lines is extremely rare (Jr., 2007). When marrying
out occurs, most researchers uncover a link between faster assimilation of the minority spouse
and intermarriage, though the causal link is disputable (Meng and Gregory, 2005; ?; Nottmeyer,
2010). Empirical evidence also finds positive assortative matching in mixed marriage markets.
The evidence on the role of local marriage market conditions in the decision to marry out is more
mixed. This empirical literature is largely based on modern data sources and the focus of the mixed
marriages are often between immigrant males and Native females. Inference from historical data is
arguably cleaner since the increased rates of co-habitation and other unobservable traits make the
drivers of mixed marriages harder to identity.
In this paper, I investigate whether standard economic theories on marriage can be applied to
mixed marriages in a racially-divided community during the Jim Crow Era. The community is
the Eastern Cherokee Indian Reservation where the miscegenation between Cherokee Indians and
whites was not banned. The advantage of using this reservation as a case study in mixed marriages
is largely driven by the interesting nature of my constructed data set.1 The digitization of 1906
Cherokee Indian applications to receive money from the federal government also allows me to create
family trees for every husband-wife pair during these years. I can subsequently match the Cherokees
who chose to intermarry to their sibling who married a full-blooded Cherokee. I also have micro
data on livestock wealth from 1894 to 1906 which allows me to exploit within-occupational variation
in outcomes.2 Thus, I can follow a larger percentage of endogamous and exogamous households
over thirteen consecutive years rather than relying on decennial census records.
I characterize my findings into two broad categories. First, like most studies, I find that mixed
marriages, especially between a white male and a Cherokee female, are positively related to wealth
accumulation and consumption. This relationship is robust to a number of controls and holds
when within-district variation is exploited. However, when a controlling for family fixed effects,
this positive association disappears, which is consistent with positive assortative matching. I also
find that children from exogamous marriages are more likely marry out, which is additional evidence
of positive sorting. Second, I find that the fraction of mixed-blooded Cherokees within a district is
highly predictive of the decision to intermarry. This evidence is consistent with search models like
Adachi (2003) and recent empirical work by .... Taken together, the evidence from mixed marriages
on this reservation is consistent with both a Becker-style theory of marriage and local marriage
market factors.
These findings support recent research on the causal effects of intermarriage (for a recent survey
1
This reservation is unique to other Indian reservations in other dimensions. First, the land on this reservation
was never allotted so there are no restrictions on alienation based on blood quantum (Beaulieu, 1984). Second, the
Cherokees, one of the so-called “civilized tribes,” descended from societies with similar institutional and farming
traditions as Euro-Americans so there is a built-in bias against finding a positive association between intermarriage
and economic outcomes. Another advantages is that mixed marriages only started in the mid to later half of the
nineteenth century on this reservation so I will be estimating the role of initial entry into intermarriage market.
2
On the Eastern Cherokee Reservation, almost 100% of the heads of households identified themselves as farmers
in the 1900 Decennial Census.
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on identification strategies in the intermarriage literature, see ?). . Nekby (2010) and Nottmeyer
(2010) use panel data techniques to estimate the returns to intermarriage by immigrants in Germany
and Sweden, respectively, and ffter controlling for person-specific unobserved heterogeneity, both
studies find no post-marriage effects on earnings for foreign-born males who marry natives. This
paper is the only study to estimate the role of intermarriage by using sibling comparisons but I
find similar results: the wealth gain is mainly attributed to positive assortative matching.
This paper also adds to the discussion on the role of culture in American Indian economic
development. To date, the empirical evidence on the role of culture and assimilation on contemporary American Indian economic development is mixed. Cornell and Kalt (1992) and ? suggest
that cultural matches between contemporary self-governance structures and the historical experience of governance lead to economic growth. In these papers, culture only matters through its
interaction with institutional quality. Anderson and Lueck (1992), Anderson and Parker (2008),
and Trosper (1978) also show that American Indian culture and assimilation do not directly influence agricultural productivity, reservation economic growth and individual profit-maximization
behavior, respectively. Each paper uses different samples and different measures of assimilation
so comparisons are difficult but the direct role of American Indian culture has been downplayed.
Unlike these papers, my study exploits the variation in assimilation at the sub-reservation level
and, in doing so, shows that wealth differences, at least on this reservation, existed prior to the
twentieth century.
My study is most closely related to Kuhn and Sweetman (2002)’s analysis of the role of ethnicity
on labor market outcomes among Aboriginal Canadians and Gitter and Reagan (2002)’s study of
on- and off-reservation Indians. Kuhn and Sweetman (2002) use a cross-section of single- and
multiple-origin Aboriginals to show that assimilation variables like ancestral intermarriage and
residing off reserves explain more of the employment (and earnings) gap between Aboriginals and
non-Aboriginals than traditional labor market controls. They posit that labor market outcomes
improve when Aborignals acquire either more skills or cultural traits from ancestors who were part
of the majority culture. Gitter and Reagan (2002) also find that living on a reservation has a
negative impact on the probability of employment (but no effect on wages), which may reflect a
desire to maintain non-market traditions by living in larger ethnic networks. Unlike these studies,
my data allow me to estimate the role of assimilation while taking sorting into account.
The rest of the paper is structured in the following way. Section 2 provides a simple theoretical
framework to understand the empirical strategies. Section 4 discusses the data used in this paper
and section 5 discusses the results. Last, section 7 concludes the paper.
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Theoretical Considerations

I present a simple model rooted in (Becker, 1973)’s work that fixes the basic ideas behind the
decision to intermarry. Suppose that an individual i has a human capital function Hi = f (xi , yi )
which depends on their ability xi and the ability of their married partner, yi . I will assume that
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xi is influenced by the level of assimilation of their parents; therefore, individual’s i ability can be
written as
xi = xPi + vi
where xPi is the assimilation level of i’s parents and vi is an idiosyncratic random term. I assume
that xi and yi are complements in martial output: therefore, fXY > 0, which implies that the
human capital function increases when similar individuals marry.3 I also let the return to human
capital, denoted as r, depend on whether marriage is mixed: in this case, I assume that rW =
E(r|M=1) > rC = E(r|M=0) where M equals 1 if a Cherokee intermarried, zero otherwise. This
assumption is consistent with a long list of studies that finds that intermarried men earn more than
men who married within their ethnic group (for a survey, see Furtado and Trejo, 2012).
The last variable of interest is the social cost of intermarriage, Ci . Alienation from the tribe or
family would be an example of the social cost of marrying out. I assume this cost is decreasing in xPi ;
thus, individuals from families which previously intermarried will face a lower cost of intermarriage
than individuals who are the first in their family to intermarry.
According to historical sources, the cost of intermarriage varied by gender. Historical sources
suggest that many white men often married Cherokee women to gain access to the female’s property
(Perdue, 1999, 83).4 White males also disrupted the traditional matrilineal clan system of the
Cherokees:
The shamans had always objected to whites marrying Cherokee women, unless the
husbands came to live in the Cherokee towns and became one with the tribe and its
customs.... They did become Cherokee. but these whites were never pleasing to the
shamans. They would not allow the wife’s brother to instruct the children; as often as
not they moved out of town onto land of their choice and established an independent
home. (Ehle, 1989, 35).
Because to these costs, the Cherokee government heavily regulated marriages with white males.
White males were charged more for a marriage license, needed to provide evidence of no surviving
wife, and were required to provide a letter of good moral character, which needed to be signed by
at least ten reputable Cherokees. More importantly, white males forfeited the rights to Cherokee
land if the Cherokee wife deserted the residence (Murchison, 1928).
The social costs of marrying a white women within the Cherokee community were considerably
lower.5 Traditional gender roles within the household decreased the demand for Cherokee land in
3

I make a simplifying assumption that marriages are always preferred over remaining single. For a survey on gains
from specialization in marriage, see Ribar (2004).
4
In traditional Cherokee society, improvements to Cherokee land was owned by wife’s side of the family. The
residence of the married couple was also located near the wife’s parents.
5
The costs of such marriages appeared to be larger in the white communities. When Harriet Gold, a white women
from a leading Connecticut family, and Elias Boudinot, a Cherokee, decided to marry, her hometown of Cornwall,
Connecticut held a public rally against the marriage, burning effigies of herself and Boudinot. One of the members
of the mob was Gold’s brother (?).
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these marriages. The intermarriage laws passed throughout the nineteenth century also did not
mention specific laws against marriages with white women.
The decision of an individual is therefore to marry within the tribe or marry out. Given this
setup, an individual will marry out (or intermarry) if the net present value of intermarriage is no
smaller than the present value of marrying in:
rW f (xi , yi ) − C(xPi ) ≥ rC f (xi , yi )
From this expression, this model predicts positive assortative matching in the intermarriage
market. Thus, if a Cherokee decides to marry a white, the Cherokee would have likely descended
from a family that previously intermarried. There are two explanations for this result: the human
capital (or martial output) function increases when the abilities of a Cherokee and a white individual
are similar; and the cost of intermarriage is lower for previously-assimilated families.
This model also predicts that as the cost of intermarriage increases, the degree of positive
assortative matching in intermarriages increases.6 Stated differently, when the social costs of intermarriage increases, the probability of marrying out falls but the degree of positive selection among
those marriages will increase. This result will serve as the basis of the empirical strategy as the
degree of positive selection should be greater with marriages between white males and Cherokees
females.

3

Empirical Strategy

The previous framework suggests that the difference in average economic outcomes between a
biracial (mixed marriage) household and a mono-ethnic (endogamous marriage) household is driven
by the gains from intermarriage and the selection into intermarriage. exogamous and endogamous
households is driven by the gains from intermarriage and the selection into intermarriage. These
mechanisms can be neatly summarized with an equation commonly adopted in program evaluation
(Angrist and Pischke, 2009, 14):

E[Yi |Mi = 1] − E[Yi |Mi = 0] = E[(Y1i − Y0i )|Mi = 1] + E[Y0i |Mi = 1] − E[Y0i |Mi = 0]
|
{z
} |
{z
} |
{z
}
observed gap

intermarriage premium

(1)

selection effect

where Yi is the outcome of interest (wealth or consumption) and Mi is the intermarriage indicator.
The first term on the right-hand side is the average between the outcome of the intermarried (Y1i )
and the outcome of the intermarried individuals had they not intermarried (Y0i ). This term refers
to the intermarriage premium and the leading reasons for this premium include improved linguistic
skills, greater adoption of cultural norms and increased social integration from marrying a native
6

∂x
b
1
This comparative static result is derived from ∂C
= fx (rW −r
0 > 0, where fx =
C )−C
that makes you indifferent between marrying within the tribe and marrying out.
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∂f
∂x

and x
b is the ability level

(Dribe and Lundh, 2008; Gevrek, Gevrek; Duleep and Regets, 1999; Furtado and Theodoropoulos,
2011). The second term is the average difference of the outcome of the intermarried household had
they not intermarried and the outcome of individuals in exogamous individuals. The selection bias,
according to the theoretical model, is expected to be positive in intermarriages.
The second term is of course the key issue in determining the causal effect of intermarriage. This
bias has been shown recently to be the driver of the observed wealth gap. For example, Kantarevic
(2004) uses panel-data techniques to control for the selection problem on U.S. immigrants and find
no evidence of a intermarriage premium. In addition, Nekby (2010) and Nottmeyer (2010) use
panel data techniques to estimate the returns to intermarriage by immigrants in Germany and
Sweden, respectively. After controlling for person-specific unobserved heterogeneity, both studies
find no post-marriage effects on earnings for foreign-born males who marry natives.
The empirical set-up can be applied to my paper is the following ways. First, I will estimate
the observed gap in wealth and consumption between mixed-married households and all-Cherokee
households using the following model:
yi,c,t = βMi + X0i,c,t Ω + τt + φc + vi,c,t

(2)

where yi,c,t is the log value of wealth (and consumption) of household i who resided in township c
in year t. Mi is the variable of interest, representing whether the individual i intermarried. In some
specifications, I differentiate between a marriage between a Cherokee and a white and a marriage
between a Cherokee and a biracial Cherokee. Xi,c,t is a vector that includes a constant and timevarying variables such as the age (and its square) of the head of household, the size of the family,
a variable indicating whether a household member attended church, an indicator that is turned on
if someone in the household worked on local road construction, a variable indicating whether the
household leased any land, and a variable indicating whether the household rented their farm. The
township fixed effects, φc , absorbs the unobservable characteristics that are unique to all households
within a township and the year fixed effects, τt , are assumed to be constant across all households
but vary across years. Finally, the time-varying error term vi,c,t satisfies the usual assumptions.
This empirical strategy simply pools the data and applies OLS to equation (2). Since the
township fixed effects are included on the right-hand-side, the estimation of equation (2) will
provide the within-township, cross-household relationship of intermarriage on economic outcomes.
If the intermarriage effect is fully explained by the observable variables, then this strategy would
eliminate any potential bias.
However, these baseline estimates are problematic since, according to the theoretical set-up,
parental characteristics, xPi , are correlated with Mi . The second empirical strategy attempts to
tease out this selection bias by controlling for parental fixed effects. Since xPi is constant within
the family, I compare the economic outcomes of siblings who and who did not intermarry. Siblingdifference (or family fixed effects) models take into account the fixed unobservable characteristics,
xPi , that are assumed to be shared by siblings, and, under the above assumption, are uncorrelated
with Mi .
6

How would one expect the sibling-difference estimates of β compare to the OLS estimates
in equation (2)? The theoretical model suggests that the OLS baseline estimates are positively
biased: therefore, vi and Mi are positively correlated. Therefore, controlling for xPi would reduce
the positive bias obtained in the OLS estimate. Additionally, the size of the positive bias will
vary by the ethnicity of the husband (or wife). Marrying a white husband should contain a larger
positive bias than marrying a white wife.
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Data

4.1

OIA Censuses

The main data used in this paper are drawn from household-level censuses taken by the Office of
Indian Affairs (OIA), later renamed the Bureau of Indian Affairs. From roughly 1875 to 1906, the
Interior Department collected annual censuses on Indian reservations and published reservationlevel aggregates in the Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs.7 A typical report
contained information on the age and gender distribution on each reservation, the total number of
acres broken and cultivated, the amount invested in livestock, and the total farm production. To
my knowledge, the Eastern Cherokee Indian Reservation microdata are the only individual censuses
to have survived from this period.
There is little evidence suggesting these censuses were imprecisely measured. Census enumerators were selected from members of the tribe and collected information on households living in
the same township as themselves. The enumerators often took multiple days to enumerate their
townships. For example, in 1903, Sibbald Smith, a Cherokee aged 24, took four days to enumerate
259 individuals within 60 households in Big Cove, the same township where Smith lived. In 1899,
John Tahquette took eight days to collect information on 110 households living in two neighboring
townships, Big Cove and Yellow Hill. Some enumerators took less time such as Jeff Arneach who
took one and a half days to collect information; however, his particular township was occupied by
only 74 individuals living in 15 separate households. Thus, the effort by enumerators appears to
be uniform across censuses. Also, in most census years, a second person signed off on the accuracy
of the census information.
The unit of observation is annual agricultural and population data on Eastern Cherokee households. The OIA data provide information on the degree of animal husbandry of each household by
listing the number of heads of six types of livestock: cattle, sheep, pigs, fowls, horses and mules.
For each household, the number of literate household members and the number of church members
were also collected. These data were typically linked to the name of the head of household; however,
in later years, the name, gender and age of each household member were also listed.
The main outcome of interest is the inflation-adjusted value of the heads of livestock. Livestock
prices are taken from Carter et al. (2006)’s Historical Statistics (Tables Da969, Da971, Da973,
7

These reservation-level data have been adopted by others, most notably Carlson (1981) who estimated the impact
of allotment on American Indian farming.
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Da984, Da986, Da1040) and those prices are deflated using the historical BLS price index (Carter
et al., 2006, Table Cc1).8
The OIA censuses exist from 1894 to 1906 with some gaps between years. For example, there
are no data for the year 1896. The data were organized into seven township within the reservation:
Yellow Hill, Big Cove, Soco (sometimes called Wolftown), Birdtown, Nantahala, Cherokee County
and Graham County. In some years, there were no data collected for certain townships: for example,
in 1904, only data in Big Cove, Yellow Hill and Soco exist. In sum, there are 43 separate census
books with a total of 2,473 household-by-year observations.

4.2

Eastern Cherokee Applications

The ancestry of each adult listed in the OIA censuses can be recovered by using the 1906-1909 Eastern Band Applications of the U.S. Court of Claims. Detailed familial information on any Cherokee
Indian living at this time was collected due to a U.S. Court of Claims decision in favor of three
separate civil suits filed against the federal government by both the Eastern and Western Cherokee
tribes.9 In order to receive a share of this award, the U.S. Court of Claims, under the leadership of
the court-appointed commissioner Guion Miller, set the following eligibility requirements: (1.) the
claimant must be living on May 28, 1906, the date of the award; (2.) the claimant must have been
either a member of the Cherokee tribe during the time of one of the treaties listed in the lawsuit,
most notably the 1851 Treaty with the Cherokees, or a descendant of a Cherokee who received
treaty funds; and (3.) the individual cannot be affiliated with another tribe. From 1906 to 1909,
a total of 45,847 applications representing roughly 90,000 individual claimants were collected by
Miller. Eventually, 3,436 Cherokees living in North Carolina and 27,384 living in Indian Territory
were approved to share in this award.
These applications contain a wealth of personal information on each applicant.10 Each claimant
furnished information on his or her English and Indian name, residence, date and place of birth,
married status, name and age of wife or husband, English and Indian names of his or her parents,
place of birth of parents, date of death of each parent, and the names of their children, siblings,
cousins and grandparents on both their mother’s and father’s side. To verify authenticity, all
applications were made under oath and supported by two witnesses who were acquainted with the
claimant.
I use two strategies to determine the race of an ancestor. First, if a spouse of an applicant did
not contain any Cherokee ancestors, then the enumerator would list this person by his or her race.
Additionally, if a parent or grandparent of an applicant did not contain any Cherokee ancestors,
8

There are some limitations in the price data. Data on the market price of chickens start in 1909. In place of
annual prices, I use the average price per head from 1909-1921.
9
As a consequence of selling the Cherokee Outlet to the federal government, a Congressional act in 1902 allowed
the Cherokees to file suit against the federal government for violations of past treaty stipulations. Three suits, each
regarding separate cases in which money was due to the Cherokees, were brought before the U.S. Court of Claims,
and in May 1905, the court ruled in favor of the Cherokees. In 1906, Congress finally appropriated over $1 million
plus interest which was distributed to the Cherokees on a per capita basis (Archives et al., 1967).
10
Electronic copies of these applications are available through the military genealogical website, www.fold3.com.
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then the enumerator would also typically write “white” beneath the parent’s or grandparent’s
name. For example, Will West Arneach, a Cherokee (in blood quantum terms, 34 th Cherokee) born
in 1849, had a mother Jenny Arneach (née Reed) whose father, Bill Reed, was white. Even though
Bill Reed had a Cherokee name, Wi-li S-ga-tsi, the notary added the comment “white” below Bill
Reed’s name. Therefore, it is commonly straightforward to determine the racial identification of
each family member.
A second strategy is used when the name of an ancestor, commonly a grandparent, is omitted
from the applications. The missing information is likely due to the applicant’s lack of knowledge
of his or her grandparent’s name. However, if the missing grandparent is not of Cherokee descent,
then the variable of interest would contain measurement error. To resolve this potential issue, I
locate the applicant in the 1900 or 1910 Indian schedules in the regular census which lists the degree
of Cherokee blood for each individual. For example, if a Cherokee applicant contained only one
white grandparent, then this Cherokee would be considered

1
4 th

Cherokee in the regular census.

By adopting this information, I can deduce the race of a grandparent whose name (and race) was
missing in the applications.11 This strategy was only necessary in a few cases.
Based on this information, I use the following simple indicator variable to capture the ancestry
of each household head.


1
Mi =
0

if the ith individual married a individual who has at least one white ancestor;

(3)

otherwise.

Since the racial information of a household head’s great grandparent is unknown, this variable
equals one if the white ancestor was either a parent or grandparent. In the case that the only white
ancestor of a household head was his great grandparent, then this individual would be considered
7
8 th

Cherokee (or

1
8 th

white). For this analysis, any Cherokee who is at least

7
8 th

Cherokee is

considered a full-blooded Cherokee. This is not much of a concern here since this reservation was
isolated from neighboring white settlements until the mid-nineteenth century.

4.3

Descriptive Statistics

The descriptive statistics of the variables used in this analysis are listed in Table 1. I create an
unbalanced panel with successful matches between the OIA censuses and the applications dataset.
In sum, 2,473 observations were listed in the OIA census and 2,000 (with 1,656 containing wealth
data) were matched to the applications data. This matching rate (81%) did not generate noticeable
differences between the outcomes of matched and unmatched households.12 Table 1 reveals that
11

This exercise was also used for the entire sample to verify the racial information in the applications. In the
rare case where the blood quantum differed between the applications and the Indian schedules, I queried additional
genealogical websites like familytreemaker.com and ancestry.com to determine the racial ancestry of a Cherokee head
of household.
12
Differences between the matched and unmatched samples are located in Appendix Table A1.
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livestock wealth are noticeable higher on average in households with at least one white ancestor.
The number of English users and church members per household also differ by ancestral group.
Thus, simple comparisons of livestock wealth across groups may be misleading.
The descriptive statistics highlight the correlation between intermarriage and wealth accumulation. Part of this correlation might be driven by observable differences across households with
different racial ancestries. More importantly, those who decided to intermarry and those who did
not may differ in unobservable ways. The empirical strategies adopted in this paper attempt to
assess whether this correlation holds when these differences are accounted for.

5

Baseline Results

Figure 2 provides an initial view of the relationship livestock accumulation and the cultural ancestry
of Cherokee Indians. The effect of having a white man as the head of household is positive,
statistically significant, and relatively constant across census years.
Table 2 presents the OLS regressions of equation (2). In each regression, the standard errors
are robust to heteroskedasticity.13 In each regression, the reference group is households with only
Cherokee ancestry on both the husband’s and wife’s side. Column 1 shows that households headed
by a white man and a Cherokee female were 30 log points (36 percent) wealthier than households
headed by both a Cherokee male and female. The wealth advantage of households with white males
increased if the wife was of white descend. In this case, the households comprised of male and female
with white ancestry were 34 log points (or 40 percent) wealthier than households without any white
ancestry. Last, households with Cherokee males and white females were, on average, less wealthy
than households with only Cherokees, though this estimate becomes positive when controls are
added.
In column 2, the wealth effect of marrying a white male is qualitatively unchanged when a
full set of time-varying household characteristics are included, In this regression, the coefficient
on the husband’s white ancestry variable is 0.292 (s.e.=0.122) and is significant at 5% level while
the coefficient while the coefficient on the wife’s ancestry indicator is positive but insignificant.
Column 3 shows the results from a regression where township fixed effects are included. Households
with a white husband and a Cherokee wife hold a 32 log points advantage in wealth even when
locational differences are controlled for. However, the effect of marrying a white female is positive
but statistically insignificant at standard levels.
The same exercise is run for determining the effect of marrying out on annual consumption.
This measure is likely to be driven more by differences in human capital. In the most parsimonious
specification (column 4), households with white males and Cherokee females produced 22 log points
more consumption than households without any white ancestry. The role of marrying white females
is mixed. In Column 4, the effect of marrying white females was positive and large with respect
to consumption levels. Columns 5 and 6 show that the coefficient do not vary qualitatively when
13

I used other methods such as closeting by surnames and the results are qualitatively similar.
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controls are added.
In sum, the positive effect of wealth from intermarriage is the strongest if the husband descend
from at least one exogamous marriage. Households with either white wives or wives who descended
from an exogamous marriage were not wealthier than households with full-blooded Cherokee wives.

6

Sibling-Difference Results

As mentioned above, the pooled OLS regressions cannot account for unobserved family background
effects which might influence the decision to intermarry.
Table ?? shows the results from the sibling-difference regressions which absorb the unobserved
fixed characteristics shared by children from the same parents. The individual controls, when
included, are listed in the footnote to the table. The first four columns control for family fixed
effects by defining the family as siblings from the same parents. Since several Cherokee men had
children with multiple women, the last two columns allows for the family fixed effect to be constant
among full- and half-siblings. There are 110 observations where deviations of intermarriage from the
family mean occurred. When I expand the family to include half-sisters, the sample size increases
to 125.
Column 1 shows that Cherokee sisters who married men with at least one white ancestor held
more wealth than sisters who married full-blooded Cherokee men. The coefficient on husband’s
with white ancestry is 0.450 (s.e.=0.123) without controls and 0.478 (s.e.=0.126) with controls.
When individual controls are added and township and year dummies are included, a household
with a husband with white ancestry is 51 log points greater than a household with a husband with
only Cherokee ancestry. Thus, the family fixed effects, when compared to column 2 of equation 2,
increase the estimated effect of intermarriage by 67%. This suggests that the estimates without
family fixed effects are biased downward, which implies that controlling for family fixed effects only
strengthens the earlier result.
Column 4 isolates the gains from marrying a white male from the gains from marrying a male
with biracial ancestry. Sisters who married a white male are estimated to have held 46 log points
more in livestock wealth than sisters who married full-blooded Cherokees. The wealth gain from
marrying a male with mixed-white ancestry is slightly larger (52 log points) and highly significant;
however, the difference in coefficients among these two measures of intermarriage are statistically
indistinguishable.
The final two columns make full- and half-sibling comparisons and the results are qualitatively
similar to columns 3 and 4. In each case, the coefficient on the intermarriage indicators is positive,
highly significant and larger than the OLS estimates in Table 2. For example, in column 5, the
fixed effect estimate of β suggests that the wealth difference between males with and without white
ancestry was 40% of a standard deviation of the outcome, when accounting for family fixed effects.
The basic findings from estimating the fixed effect estimate of intermarriage is that unions
of white males and Cherokee females earn significantly more than unions of Cherokee males and

11

females. I estimate some additional fixed effect specifications to assess whether functional form
errors influence the estimated coefficient on β. I modify the specification in Table ??, column 3
in four ways: (1.) by omitting potential outliers which are defined as households located in the
bottom 12.5% and top 97.5% of the outcome distribution; (2.) by eliminating all observations
with a Cook’s distance greater than one; (3.) by clustering at the township level which controls
for serial correlation within Cherokee towns; and (4.) by introducing a lagged dependent variable
as a check against mean reversion (see Arellano and Bond, 1991). Each specification is estimated
using OLS except for column 2 which uses weights from an iterative process that down-weights
observations with large residuals and Column 4 uses GMM to alleviate the bias from including a
lagged dependent variable on the right-hand-side.
Table ?? reveals that the positive coefficient on the husband’s white ancestry indicator is relatively stable and highly significant across each specifications. These alternative models continue
to reveal that the white ancestry effect is much stronger than the results without the family fixed
effects.
In sum, the fixed effects estimates of β are positive, highly significant and stronger than the
cross-household comparisons. An interpretation of these results implies that there may have been
negative selection into intermarriage by Cherokee families. Another interpretation is that the sibling
variation in intermarriage is endogenous in this equation ??. If a more acculturated sibling is more
likely to intermarry, then the sibling-difference estimates could be positively bias. To assess the role
of unobserved factors on the positive effect of white ancestry on animal husbandry, I follow Altonji
et al. (2005) in estimating the ratio of selection on unobservables to selection on observables needed
to overturn the positive effect of each cultural indicator. Intuitively, this approach determines how
large the relative effect of the unobservables need to be to explain away the return of white ancestry.
A large and positive ratio indicates that the covariance between white ancestry and unobservables
needs to be substantially larger than the covariance between white ancestry and the controls to
explain away the positive association. A negative ratio on the other hand shows that the effect of
white ancestry increases in size when the controls are added which suggests that unobserved skills
do not generate an upward bias.
As shown in Tables 2 and ??, when controlling for time-varying factors and family fixed effects,
estimates of the gain from intermarriage become stronger. Therefore, this ratio is negative (equal
to -4.07 when compared to a regression without any controls), which implies that if sibling-specific
factors could be controlled for, the observed wealth difference by intermarriage would be even
greater.

7

Concluding Remarks

In the paper, I use historical data on wealth accumulation to test whether intermarriages influence wealth accumulation among the Eastern Cherokee Indians living in North Carolina at the
turn-of-the-twentieth century. I find that cross-household comparisons yield the standard results:
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male heads of household that contain at least one white ancestor are substantially wealthier than
households without white ancestry. However, once unobservable family background characteristics
are controlled for, the fixed effects estimates reveal that the intermarriage effect is reduced.
This paper has disentangled the causal effect of intermarriage on livestock wealth from selection
effects into intermarriage. The positive wealth and consumption differences from intermarriage
among the Cherokees do appear to be driven by selection into intermarriage. The positive selection
is the stronger in marriages between white males and Cherokee females. The simple model presented
here suggests that differential costs to intermarriage may be driving the positive selection into those
marriages.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics [Matched OIA/Applications Sample]
Full Sample
Mean
S.D.

White Ancestry
Mean
S.D.

Cherokee Ancestry
Mean
S.D.

106.66

[116.76]

126.47

[136.28]

98.77

[107.05]

Cattle (heads)

2.81

[3.29]

3.34

[3.97]

2.60

[2.95]

Sheep (heads)

1.47

[4.55]

2.27

[5.78]

1.15

[3.91]

Pigs (heads)

5.32

[8.22]

5.50

[8.35]

5.25

[8.16]

Fowls (heads)

26.76

[30.83]

28.15

[36.63]

26.21

[28.17]

Horses (heads)

0.27

[0.67]

0.41

[0.87]

0.22

[0.56]

Mules (heads)

0.06

[0.36]

0.07

[0.34]

0.05

[0.36]

Acres Cultivated

12.28

[11.36]

12.71

[13.28]

12.10

[10.49]

Age of Head

44.40

[14.73]

44.89

[15.15]

44.21

[14.56]

Family Size

5.16

[2.26]

5.08

[2.54]

5.19

[2.14]

Males

2.75

[1.48]

2.85

[1.61]

2.71

[1.43]

Females

2.40

[1.38]

2.23

[1.45]

2.47

[1.35]

English Language Users

1.82

[2.04]

2.95

[2.55]

1.37

[1.58]

Church Members

0.65

[1.02]

0.77

[1.15]

0.61

[0.96]

Observations

1766

Livestock Wealth ($1900)

546

1220

Notes: Mean values are weighted by average family size. Livestock and crop values as well as the
price deflator are taken Carter et al. (2006), Tables Cc1, Da597, Da770, Da742, Da735, Da678,
Da969, Da971, Da984 and Da1040.
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Table 2: Baseline OLS Results
logged Wealth

logged Consumption

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Husband with White Ancestry

0.306***
(0.099)

0.292**
(0.122)

0.318**
(0.125)

0.224***
(0.074)

0.169*
(0.100)

0.221**
(0.099)

Wife with White Ancestry

-0.314**
(0.150)

0.069
(0.177)

-0.063
(0.184)

-0.075
(0.073)

0.061
(0.110)

0.009
(0.112)

Both Husband and Wife with White Ancestry

0.347*
(0.189)

-0.083
(0.242)

0.081
(0.246)

0.257**
(0.117)

-0.086
(0.180)

-0.104
(0.179)

No
No
Yes
1,571
0.047

20.41
Yes
No
Yes
1,175
0.236

15.02
Yes
Yes
Yes
1,175
0.259

No
No
Yes
1,379
0.087

5.54
Yes
No
Yes
1,017
0.267

4.26
Yes
Yes
Yes
1,017
0.301

F-statistic on controls
Controls
Township Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
Observations
R-squared

Notes: The Huber-White standard errors are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** represent significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table 3: The Intermarriage Effects of Marrying White Men: Family Fixed Effects Regressions
Panel A: Parental Fixed Pairs
logged Wealth

logged Consumption

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Husband with White Ancestry

-0.153
(0.157)

-0.035
(0.339)

0.069
(0.343)

0.085
(0.137)

-0.097
(0.356)

0.088
(0.127)

Within-Family Variation in Mi
Observations
R-squared

138
1,466
0.535

138
1,165
0.593

138
1,165
0.600

138
1,138
0.558

138
1,008
0.581

138
1,277
0.522

Panel B: Surname Fixed Effects
logged Wealth

Husband with White Ancestry

Within-Surname Variation in Mi
Observations
R-squared
Individual Controls
Year Fixed Effects
Township Fixed Effects

logged Consumption

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.057
(0.115)

-0.152
(0.177)

-0.077
(0.186)

0.227
(0.143)

0.003
(0.212)

0.354
(0.221)

399
1,466
0.440

399
1,165
0.557

399
1,165
0.562

399
1,138
0.492

399
1,008
0.501

399
898
0.568

No
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
Yes

No
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
Yes

Notes: The Huber-White standard errors are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** represent significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
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Table 4: The Intermarriage Effects of Marrying White Women: Family Fixed Effects Regression
Panel A: Brother Pairs
logged Wealth

Wife with White Ancestry

Within-Family Variation in Mi
Observations
R-squared

logged Consumption

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.120
(0.292)

3.117
(5.278)

3.404
(5.228)

0.040
(0.274)

-4.583
(5.379)

0.110
(0.188)

42
1,465
0.619

42
1,164
0.646

42
1,164
0.651

42
1,137
0.644

42
1,007
0.636

42
1,276
0.615

Panel B: Surname Pairs
logged Wealth

Wife with White Ancestry

Within-Surname Variation in Mi
Observations
R-squared
Individual Controls
Year Fixed Effects
Township Fixed Effects

logged Consumption

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

-0.292**
(0.136)

-0.450***
(0.169)

-0.467***
(0.170)

0.106
(0.099)

-0.044
(0.132)

-0.084
(0.131)

110
1,571
0.396

110
1,175
0.533

110
1,175
0.541

110
1,219
0.487

125
1,017
0.499

125
1,017
0.509

No
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
Yes

No
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
Yes

Notes: The Huber-White standard errors are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** represent significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
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Table A1: Differences between Matched and Unmatched Samples
All Households
Livestock Wealth ($1900)
Pigs (heads)
Fowls (heads)
Horses (heads)
Mules (heads)
Crop Value ($1900)
Wheat (bu.)
Corn (bu.)
Potatoes (bu.)
Oats (bu.)
Acres Cultivated
Crop Output per Acre ($)
Family Size
English Language Users
Church Members
Observations

Unmatched
98.05
(117.7)
4.175
(6.459)
28.23
(48.17)
0.307
(0.836)
0.0785
(0.458)
43.32
(64.22)
3.995
(13.19)
104.8
(159.9)
17.46
(66.34)
2.962
(10.56)
11.75
(17.35)
3.946
(5.458)
5.415
(2.860)
2.430
(2.787)
0.820
(1.172)
473

Matched
105.8
(115.3)
5.173
(8.007)
26.23
(30.47)
0.278
(0.679)
0.0542
(0.340)
49.48
(88.11)
4.826
(15.47)
92.80
(133.7)
25.74
(155.6)
2.640
(10.57)
12.01
(11.12)
4.546
(5.978)
5.076
(2.257)
1.811
(2.017)
0.646
(1.005)
2000

Excluding “Blank” Observations
p-value
0.0522∗
0.0192∗∗

Unmatched
139.4
(119.5)
5.975
(7.052)

Matched
124.7
(115.8)
6.098
(8.397)

p-value
0.0745∗

56.95
(70.98)
5.166
(15.01)

55.85
(94.21)
5.560
(16.64)

0.9108

14.67
(19.33)

13.22
(11.41)

0.5415

5.711
(2.978)
2.606
(2.991)

5.234
(2.256)
1.936
(2.075)

0.1268

301

1656

0.6157

0.4659
0.8085
0.3311
0.0071∗∗∗
0.0113∗∗

0.2375

0.8632
0.1956
0.2255
0.0739∗
0.1699
0.0010∗∗∗
0.0392∗∗

0.0751∗

0.1342

Notes: The standard deviation is listed in parentheses below the mean. The p-value is from a standard two-sided
comparison of means test.

∗

p < 0.10,

∗∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗∗

p < 0.01

Source: See Table 1.
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